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Abstract
In spite of an identical initial condition, why are some parts of the world so rich
and others so poor? To address this question, this paper constructs a simple theoretical
model that incorporates human infrastructure and child labor The first part of the paper
shows that the condition of bifurcation from an identical initial condition depends on the
technology level. We also show that current dynamic trends highly depend on initial
endowments and productivity. The second part of the paper examines the effect of
development assistance in recipient countries. By analyzing two types of programs; the
elimination of child labor and support to strengthen human infrastructure, we show that
the former (latter) program is effective for middle- (low-) income countries.
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1 Introduction
As noted by Clark (2008), the average person in the year 1800 was no better off than the
average person in 100,000 BC. However, the Industrial Revolution of two hundred years ago
irreversibly changed the possibilities for material consumption. Incomes per person began to
exhibit sustained growth in a favored group of countries, and the richest economies are now
10 to 20 times wealthier than the average economy in 1800. Prosperity, however, is not the
case in all societies. Material consumption in some countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa,
is now well below pre-industrial levels.
The Industrial Revolution increased mechanization and the associated labor, and many
unskilled workers including children played a role in economic activities. Mechanization im-
proved productivity and fostered economic development. The highly successful countries of
today increased their stock of human capital and infrastructure in the early stages of industrial
development, which increased household income and decreased the ratio of child labor (see
Figure 1). A lag delayed some countries from developing and setting up manufacturing, but
the fruits of prosperity were gradually realized (see Figure2). The countries with a significant
lag in prosperity are still suffering economically, and many children are involved in economic
activities (see Figure 3)1. Why has industrialization failed to make all countries rich, and
why do large parts of the world still suffer from poverty? Because an increasing presence
of emerging country is expected to be a driving force in the global economy, identifying the
cause of stagnation and resolving it in less-developed countries has gained much attention.
Many studies have addressed the importance of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, public
transportation, and energy facilities on economic development (see for example, Calderon and
Chong (2004), Easterly and Rebelo (1993),Gramlich (1994), and Garcia-Mila, McGuire, and
Porter (1996) ) and show the positive correlation between the stock of infrastructure and
development (The World Bank (1994)). These types of infrastructure are known as phys-
ical infrastructure or public capital, and they improve the efficiency of economic activities.
Because economic growth can also shape the demand and supply of physical infrastructure ser-
vices, the underdevelopment of infrastructure is considered the cause of a lag in development
1The proportion of children aged between five and 17 years who work amounts to 19.6 % in Africa, 7.4
% in Asia and the Pacific countries, 5.3 % in the Americas, 4.1 % in Europe and Central Asia, and 2.9 % in
Arab States (ILO (2017)).
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(Esfahani and Ramirez-Giraldo (2003)). There is no doubt that the development of physical
infrastructure is central to economic development; however, other aspects of infrastructure,
such as the level of health care, education, and nutrition, also contribute to economic devel-
opment. For example, better public health improves the overall well-being of society because
healthier individuals are less myopic and tend to place greater value in the future2; healthy
individuals prefer to acquire human capital (Jimenez (1995) and Bedi and Edwards (2002)).
This type of infrastructure classified apart from physical infrastructure and known as human
infrastructure (Jimenez (1995)). Human infrastructure increases the level of human capital
and productivity, which leads to higher wages, reduced child labor, and enhances investment
in human capital. The mechanism is expected to create a virtuous cycle endogenously, but
the analysis of the effect of human infrastructure on economic development has not received
much attention in existing literature. The analytical research on how the accumulation of hu-
man infrastructure affects economic development is extremely important to clarify the cause
of poverty and to find its solution. For this purpose, we set up a simple theoretical model
incorporating child labor and human infrastructure and investigate the causes of bifurcation
from an identical initial condition. By assuming that an increase in human infrastructure im-
proves the marginal productivity of labor, the first part of this paper analyzes the transition
dynamics to determine the reason why one economy can develop and another cannot despite
having the same initial condition. The second part of this paper investigates the possibility
of sustainable growth in developing countries. Because development aid is the main source
of support for less developed countries, and the amount of net official development assistance
is increasing year by year3, we examine the effect of development aid on poverty-stricken
countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 characterizes the dynamic equilibrium path and analyzes the condition of divergence and
poverty. Section 4 analyzes the effect of development aid, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2Agenor (2010).
3US$6.817 billion (1970), US$34.475 (1980), US$58.242 (1990), US$49.804 (2000), US$130.685 (2010), and
US$157.676 (2016) (See World Bank (2018)).
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2 The Model
Consider an infinite-horizon economy composed of households, perfectly competitive firms,
and a government. A new generation of a unit mass, referred to as generation t, is born in
period t− 1. Time is indexed by t = 1, 2, · · · . Generation t ≥ 1 is composed of a continuum
of Nt units who live for three periods: childhood, adulthood, and oldhood.
Human Infrastructure
As noted by Jimenez (1995), human infrastructure can be classified separately from physical
infrastructure (transport, energy, water). It is defined as public capital that improves societal
levels of health status, education, nutrition, and labor productivity. Human infrastructure
also includes sanitation, environment, and legal and political institutional systems. When the
level of human infrastructure is considered as an index gt, the level of human infrastructure in
period t + 1 gt+1 accumulates through investment in human infrastructure, i
G
t , and the level
of human infrastructure in the preceding period t gt:
gt+1 = i
G
t + (1− δ)gt, (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of human infrastructure.
Firms
In each period, there exists two potential sectors that are employed by Hazan and Berdugo
(2002). Production will take place in either one of them or in both. The existence of one sector
is independent of the existence of the other, and the existence of each sector is determined
by the optimal choices of individuals. Each sector produces consumption goods but employs
different factors: one sector employs only raw labor while the other employs efficiency units
of labor. We refer to the former as the “traditional sector” and to the later as the “modern
sector.” The production function of the traditional sector is ytrat = y¯lt, where y
tra, y¯, and
lt represent per capita output in the traditional sector, the productivity in the traditional
sector, and the quantities of raw labor, respectively. The wage rate in the traditional sector is
wtra = y¯. The modern production function is given by ymot = y(gt, ht) = ηφ(gt)ht, where y
mo
t ,
η > 0, and ht, show per capita output in the modern sector, the level of technology, and the
level of human capital at period t, respectively. φ(gt) represents labor productivity, which is
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augmented by the level of per capita human infrastructure where φ′(gt) > 0, φ′′(gt) < 0, and
φ(0) = 0. The wage rate in the modern sector is set as wmot = ηφ(gt).
Government
We assume that government monitors child labor and human infrastructure investment. The
government levies income tax on adult agents4 and allocates it between two policy programs:
child labor inspection and investment in human infrastructure. By assuming that whether a
firm employs children is private information, the government must inspect each firm to reveal
the extent of child labor by investing the cost γ5. Inspection is not always successful, and the
revealed child labor probability depends on the inspection cost pi(γ) (0 ≤ pi(γ) < 1) and also
has the properties: pi′(γ) > 0, pi′′(γ) < 0, pi(0) = 0, limγ→∞ pi′(γ) = 0, and limγ→0 pi′(γ) = ∞.
If the government can expose child labor, the company must pay a fine depending on the
amount that its child workers produce. Noting that the detection probability is pi(γ), the
income from child labor is wc = (1−pi(γ))y¯, and aggregate fines are pi(γ)y¯lct where lct shows the
amount of child labor. The fines are redistributed to non-returnable government investments
such as self-defense.6 The residual amount of tax income is allocated to human infrastructure
investment: iGt = Tt − γ7 where Tt shows aggregate tax revenue.
Individuals
The individuals of generation t are identical in their preferences. They live for three periods:
child, adult, and old period, with an endowed one unit of time in each period. The adult
agent (generation t) has a child and allocates their child (generation t− 1) to either work lct
or school et in period t. When parents send their children to work, children can earn wage
income wct . The sum of the time spent by children at work or in school must be unity, and
each value for time spent must lie between zero and unity in each period:
lct + et = 1, 0 ≤ lct ≤ 1, 0 ≤ et ≤ 1. (2)
4Because child labor is a hidden action, the government cannot levy tax on child labor.
5For example, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in the Republic of Turkey introduced a program
enforcing the supervision of child labor from 1994. As a result, the number of working children who were 15
years old or less decreased between 1997 and 1999 in Turkey (OECD (2003)) .
6When the fines are redistributed to investment in human infrastructure, we obtain the same results.
7If we set γ = µTt where µ ∈ (0, 1), we obtain the same results.
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As in Galor and Weil (1996, 2000), and Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun (2004), we assume
that the level of human capital is an increasing function of the time devoted to schooling et.
Additionally, the level of human capital is also an increasing and strictly concave function
of human infrastructure gt. For analytical tractability, we assume that individuals born in
period t obtain their human capital as follows:
ht+1 = h(et, ht) ≡ θetgσt , θ > 0, 0 < σ < 1, (3)
where θ and σ express the parameters of education efficiency and the adjusted elasticity of
human capital with respect to educational level, respectively.
When an individual becomes an adult, that individual has children and decides whether
to donate all of their time to the traditional or modern sector. The decision is made according
to aggregate income: (1 − τ)wtralt and (1 − τ)wmot htlt. Noting that lt = 1, potential income
Yt is decided as follows,
Yt = max{(1− τ)wtra, (1− τ)wmot }. (4)
When parents consume all of their family income; that is, their own income and that of
their children, we have a budget constraint for that adult as follows:
ct = Yt + (1− pi(γ))wct lct . (5)
Figure 4 shows a sketch of the relationship between each generation.
An individual from generation t has preference over their consumption ct and the level of
human capital of their children ht+1. We assume the following utility function:
Ut = log ct + β log ht+1, (6)
where β ∈ (0, 1) indicates the degree of altruism by parents toward their children.
At each time point, adult individuals first decide their occupation by comparing the income
of both sectors and then allocating their children’s time by maximizing (6) subjects from (4) to
(5). Hence, for given levels of wtra, wmot , and w
c, the optimization problem of each individual
of generation t can be expressed as follows:
max
lt
Ut = log{Yt + (1− pi(γ))wclct}+ β log{θ(1− lt)gσt },
s.t. 0 ≤ lct < 1.
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The first-order condition with respect to lt is given by
∂Ut
∂lct
=
(1− pi(γ))wct
Yt + (1− pi(γ))wct lct
− β
1− lct
S 0, (with equality if 0 < lct < 1). (7)
The first and second terms on the right-hand side of (7) represent the marginal benefit and
the marginal cost of child labor.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we examine the equilibrium and dynamic system of the economy.
3.1 Equilibrium
At first, the adult individual makes the occupational choice by comparing an expected income.
Substituting the wage rate into (4), the individual who satisfies ht ≤ y¯/ηφ(gt) ≡ h chooses an
occupation in the traditional sector and h¯ ≤ ht chooses an occupation in the modern sector.
Next, the individual maximizes their utility by choosing the working time of their children.
Noting the individual who has h ≤ ht work in the modern sector, we obtain the following
equilibrium relationship between child labor and human capital:
lct (ht, gt) ≡ lct =

1− pi(γ)− β(1− τ)
(1 + β)(1− pi(γ)) if ht ≤ h,
(1− pi(γ))y¯ − β(1− τ)ηφ(gt)ht
(1 + β)(1− pi(γ))y¯ , if h ≤ ht ≤ h¯,
0, if h¯ ≤ ht,
(8)
where h ≡ y¯
ηφ(gt)
and h¯ ≡ (1−pi(γ))y¯
β(1−τ)ηφ(gt) . (8) show that the time spent working by children
depends on the level of human capital of the child’s parents. When the level of human capital
is sufficiently low, parents cannot earn sufficient income to survive and have to rely on their
children for income.
3.2 The Dynamic Equilibrium Path
From (2), (3), and (8), we obtain the dynamics of human capital as follows:
ht+1 =

θβ(2− τ − pi(γ))
(1 + β)(1− pi(γ))g
σ
t , if ht ≤ h,
θβ((1− pi(γ))y¯ + (1− τ)ηφ(gt)ht)
(1 + β)(1− pi(γ))y¯ g
σ
t , if h ≤ ht ≤ h¯,
θgσt , if h¯ ≤ ht.
(9)
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Accordingly, investment in human infrastructure is decided as
iGt =
{
τ y¯ − γ, if ht ≤ h,
τηφ(gt)ht − γ, if h ≤ ht,
(10)
where γ is the inspection cost of child labor. By using (1), (8), and (10), we obtain the
following:
gt+1 =
{
(1− δ)gt + τ y¯ − γ, if ht ≤ h,
(1− δ)gt + τηφ(gt)ht − γ, if h ≤ ht.
(11)
(9) and (11) show the system of this economy and indicate that the dynamics systems of the
economy are completely described by these difference equations in ht and gt. Before analyzing
the equilibrium, we consider the borderline between the regimes. For analytical tractability,
we impose8
φ(gt) = gt. (12)
This leads to the borderline relations: h and h¯ are as follows:
h ≡ ht = y¯
ηgt
, (13)
h¯ ≡ ht = (1− pi(γ))y¯
β(1− τ)ηgt . (14)
By using (9), (11), (13), and (14), we can draw the phase diagram on the (ht, gt) plane.
We refer to the locus on the (ht, gt) plane, representing ht+1 = ht as HH locus and that
representing gt+1 = gt as GG locus. The HH and GG loci represent equal parts of (9) and
(11), respectively. By applying (12), we have a complete dynamic systems as follows:
ht+1 ≥ ht ⇔
ht ≤

θβ(2− τ − pi(γ))
(1 + β)(1− pi(γ))g
σ
t ≡ H0(gt), if ht ≤ h,
θβ(1− pi(γ))y¯gσt
(1 + β)(1− pi(γ))y¯ − θβ(1− τ)ηg1+σt
≡ H1(gt), if h ≤ ht ≤ h¯,
θgσt ≡ H2(gt) if ht ≥ h¯,
(15)
gt+1 ≥ gt ⇔ gt ≤ τ y¯ − γ
δ
≡ G0, if ht ≤ h
ht ≥ δgt + γ
τηgt
≡ G1(gt), if h ≤ ht, (16)
8If we impose φ(gt) = g
, 0 <  < 1, we have the same dynamic system.
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H1(gt) and H2(gt) in (15) satisfies dH1/dgt > 0, limg→g ∂H1/∂gt = 0, limgt→g¯ ∂H1/∂gt = ∞9
and ∂H2/∂gt > 0, ∂
2H2/∂g
2
t < 0. Additionally, G1(gt) in (16) also satisfies ∂G1/∂gt < 0 and
∂2G1/∂g
2
t > 0. The phase diagrams in the economy are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. For
simplicity, we denote the saddle path described in Figure 5 and 6 as the SS curve. Because
ht and gt are state variables, their initial values h0 and g0 are historically given, and the
economies that are initially on the SS curve converge to the steady-state equilibrium. The
steady-state equilibrium (h∗, g∗) is at the intersection of the HH and GG locus. There exist
two possible equilibria, and the next lemma summarizes the differences of these equilibria.
Lemma 1 Suppose that η > (<)η¯, the high steady-state equilibrium is in the regime without
(with) child labor; that is, h¯ ≤ ht(h ≤ ht ≤ h¯). where η¯ = (1−pi(γ))y¯θβ(1−τ)η ( τ(1−pi(γ))y¯−γβ(1−τ)δβ(1−τ) )−(1+σ).
Proof. When the equilibrium is in the regime h¯ < ht, the intersect point of H1(gt) (equation
(15) and h¯ is larger than the intersect point G1(gt) (equation (16)) and h¯. Now, we define
the previous intersect point as gh and the latter as gg. Thus, we have
gh ≡
((1− pi(γ))y¯
θβ(1− τ)η
) 1
1+σ
>
τ(1− pi(γ))y¯ − γβ(1− τ)
δβ(1− τ) ≡ g
g.
By arranging the equation, it becomes η > η¯ ≡ (1−pi(γ)y¯
θ(1−τ)
( τ(1−pi(γ)y¯−γβ(1−τ)
δβ(1−τ)
)−(1+σ)
. When
productivity is high, the economy has low steady-state equilibrium and vice versa.
High productivity decreases the marginal benefit from child labor and decreases child labor in
the long run. As a result, the economy with higher productivity experiences the steady-state
equilibrium without child labor. The next proposition shows the stability of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists multiple equilibrium (E1 and E2). The higher equilibrium E2 is
a saddle point stability and satisfies the following:
η < η¯ : (g∗)1+στηθβ(1− pi(γ))y¯ = (δg∗ + γ)((1 + β)(1− pi(γ)y¯)− θβη(1− τ)(g∗)1+σ),
η > η¯ : τηθ(g∗)1+σ = δg∗ + γ.
Proof. See Appendix.
A case where the economies are initially on the SS curve is rare. In general, an economy
9g → g¯ ≡ (1 + β)(1− pi(γ))y¯/γβη(2− τ − pi(γ)))1/(1+σ) shows the level of g that satisfies H1(gt) = h, and
g¯ ≡ (γβ(2− τ − pi(γ))/(1 + β)(1− pi(γ)))σ shows the level of g that satisfies H1(gt) = h¯.
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is endowed with (h0, g0) above or below the SS curve. If (h0, g0) is at the point below the
SS curve, such as the point B (low level of human capital and human infrastructure) in
Figure 5 and Figure 6, the output is too low for workers to earn sufficient wages and to
invest in human infrastructure. Because wage incomes are low, parents must rely on their
children to supplement family income, which results in diminished accumulation of human
capital. Lower human capital prevents workers from entering the modern sector and results
in fewer resources invested in human infrastructure and lower productivity levels and wage
rates. These mechanisms create a vicious cycle, and the economy finally converges to the
poverty trap equilibrium. On the other hand, if (h0, g0) is at a point above the SS curve,
such as point G (a high level of human capital and human infrastructure) in Figure 5 and
Figure 6, output and human capital are sufficient for workers to earn sufficient wages. A
high wage released children from the need to work and enhances the government’s ability to
invest in human infrastructure. A high wage also improves the productivity of human capital
and wage rates. These mechanisms create a virtuous cycle, and the economy can perform
sustainable development.
Next, we examine the case where initial endowments is D in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Note
that the economy that has the same initial endowments has completely different dynamics.
One economy in Figure 6 experiences sustainable growth, the other economy in Figure 5 falls
into the poverty trap. The next proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 Even if initial conditions are the same, whether the economy continues to
achieve economic growth depends on productivity. When productivity is high enough, the
economy can sustain long-run growth.
As noted, when productivity is high, individuals receive higher wages, and they do not rely
on their children for family income. Additionally, higher wages increase the tax income of
government and results in greater investment in human infrastructure. This creates a virtuous
cycle, and the economy experiences sustainable growth.
3.3 Numerical Simulation
The purpose of the paper is to construct a theoretical model that explains the historically
observed changes in child labor and substantial divergence. To understand the properties
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of these dynamic equilibrium paths, we used numerical calibrated version simulations of the
model. For illustrative purpose, we parameterized the function pi(γ) as pi(γ) = αγ/(1 + αγ)
where α ∈ (0, 1). The parameters used in the baseline simulation are given in Table 1.
Treating each period as 25 years, we calculated the equilibrium values for the 10 periods from
1750 to 2000. Figure 7 to Figure 11 show the numerically analyzed transition paths of human
capital h, human infrastructure g, and child labor lc, respectively, where the initial level of
stocks are the points A,B,G, and D in Figure 5 and 6. These paths show that when the
initial point starts below (above) the SS curve, the transition dynamics of g and h fall into
the vicious cycle (diverge). Figure 7 shows the transition of the vicious cycle. In the economy,
low accumulation of human capital and social infrastructure increases the level of child labor.
These trends indicate the economy cited in Figure 3. Moreover, the economy in Figure 1 and
2 can be adapted in the economy of Figure 9 and Figure 8, respectively. For these paths,
the accumulation of human infrastructure creates a vicious cycle and increases the level of
child labor. Figure 10 and 11 show the transition path with the same initial condition. As
proposition 2 showed when productivity is low, the economy converges to a lower level of the
steady-state equilibrium.
4 The Effect of Foreign Development Assistance
This section investigates the effect of development assistance on recipient countries. Currently,
aid is the main source of support to less-developed countries, and international organizations
such as the United Nations and The World Bank support these countries through multiple
schemes (The World Bank (2009))10. One of the main schemes is a child protection program.
Because child labor prevents children from obtaining an education and hinders their physical
and mental development, the eradication of child labor is one of the goals of child protec-
tion. The other scheme is development aid whereby rich countries support poor countries by
investing in infrastructure.
We examine how these tied aids influence individual decision making and steady-state
equilibrium in recipient countries. First, we examine the effect of the child protection program.
To eradicate child labor, this aid strengthens the inspection of child labor by increasing the
10Particularly, the International Labor Organization and The World Bank jointly provide poverty eradica-
tion programs to poor countries.
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inspection cost from γ to γ′ = γ + a where a shows the total amount of aid distributed to
each developing country. Because the program decreases the marginal utility of child labor,
it decreases the incidence of child labor and contributes to increased human capital. The aid
also shifts HH loci upwards as follows:
ht+1 ≥ ht ⇔
ht ≤

θβ(2− τ − pi(γ′))
(1 + β)(1− pi(γ′))g
σ
t ≡ H ′0(gt), if ht ≤ h,
θβ(1− pi(γ′))y¯gσt
(1 + β)(1− pi(γ′))y¯ − θβ(1− τ)ηg1+σt
≡ H ′1(gt), if h ≤ ht ≤ h¯,
θgσt ≡ H ′2(gt) if ht ≥ h¯,
Aid from the child protection program also shifts the h¯ line (equation (14)) downwards. Figure
12 shows the effect of aid on the dynamics, and the dotted line shows the dynamics with aid.
The aid increases (decreases) the steady-state level of human capital of E1(E2), decreases
the level of human infrastructure of E2, and shifts the SS line downwards. Therefore, the
economy that initially occurs on the regime between SS and SS ′ curve (see point J in Figure
12) has the potential for long-run growth. The child protection program has two effects on
the steady-state welfare level. One is an income effect because the child protection program
decreases the child labor in terms of time. However, this leads to lower levels of family
income and consumption. Thus, the income effect has a negative effect on the steady-state
welfare level. The other effect is an education effect, the child protection program encourages
education and increases the stock of human capital. Thus, the education effect has a positive
effect on the steady-state welfare level. The overall effect on welfare depends on the level
of human infrastructure. When the level of human infrastructure is high, the positive effect
dominates the negative effect and vice versa.
Next, we examine the effect of development aid. Development aid supports the accumu-
lation of human infrastructure and changes investment as iGt = Tt − γ to iG′t = Tt − γ + a.
The GG loci will be amended as follows:
gt+1 ≥ gt ⇔ gt ≤ τ y¯ − γ + a
δ
≡ G′0, if ht ≤ h
ht ≥ δgt + γ − a
τηgt
≡ G′1(gt), if h¯ ≤ ht,
The aid does not have a direct effect on the accumulation of human capital, but it indirectly
increases human capital. With the new dynamics, the G′0 line shifts to the right, and the
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steady-state level of human capital and human infrastructure increase. The shift in line G′1
depends on the level of aid a. When γ > a, G′1 shifts downwards (see Figure 13), this results in
a low steady-state equilibrium for human capital and human infrastructure. The SS line also
shifts downwards; however, the economy that initially occurs on the regime between SS and
SS ′ curve (see point J in Figure 13) also has the potential for long-run growth. On the other
hand, when γ < a, G′1 shifts upwards (see Figure 14), this results in a higher steady-state
equilibrium for human capital and human infrastructure. The SS line also shifts upwards,
and the economy that initially occurs on the regime between the SS and SS ′ curve (see point
J in Figure 14) misses the potential for development. Development aid also has two effects;
consumption effect and education effect. For the lower steady-state equilibrium (E1) where
parents work in the traditional sector, the aid does not have a direct effect on family income.
The aid indirectly increases the level of human capital, which positively affects the steady-
state welfare level. For the higher steady-state equilibrium (E2) where the parents work in
the modern sector and employ child labor, the effect of aid on welfare depends on the level
of aid. When the level of aid is sufficiently large, a decrease in the marginal utility of child
labor reduces the level of child labor. However, the increased stock of human infrastructure
enhances the adult income and results in a positive income effect on the steady-state welfare
level. The more the level of human infrastructure enhances the stock of human capital, the
more positive the effect of human capital on the steady-state welfare level. When the level
of aid is sufficiently low, a decrease in the marginal utility from child labor reduces the level
of child labor. Because the aid increases the level of human infrastructure and the income
of parents, the aggregate income effect on the steady-state welfare level is ambiguous. The
aid also has a negative human capital effect on the steady-state welfare level. Therefore,
the overall effect on welfare is ambiguous. The sufficiently large level of aid is generous for
development aid. However, as we noted before, the economy that initially occurs on the SS
line is rare. The majority of economy are initially endowed with (h0, g0) above or below the
SS curve. Particularly for economies initially endowed between the SS and SS ′ line, aid
is detrimental to the economy. Therefore, when the income of the recipient country is not
extremely low but there is child labor, the aid to prevent child labor is more effective than
development assistance aid.
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When child labor is conspicuous, the aid that reduces child labor is considered more
effective than aid to enhance infrastructure. Because the direct reason for child labor is
poverty, and families rely on their children for income, aid designed to prevent child labor
is detrimental to welfare. Although development aid may not seem directly related to the
eradication of child labor, it has the effect of enhancing adult income and results in low levels
of child labor.
5 Conclusion
The average person in year 1800 was no better off than the average person in 100,000 BC.
However, the Industrial Revolution that occurred two hundred years ago irrevocably changed
the possibilities for material consumption. Incomes per person reached a phase of sustained
growth in a favored group of countries. The richest modern economies are now 10 to 20
times wealthier than the average economy in the year 1800. Prosperity, however, is not
enjoyed by all societies. Material consumption in some countries, mainly in sub-Saharan
Africa, is now well below pre-industrial levels. Why did industrialization fail to benefit the
whole world? Why did it make substantial areas of the world even poorer? To address
these questions, this paper constructs a simple theoretical model, which incorporates human
infrastructure and child labor. In the first part of the paper, we show that when the economy
has the same initial condition, the economy with a high level of technology exhibits sustainable
growth. However, the economy with a low level of technology falls into the poverty trap. In
addition, we show the historically observed trends in child labor and development. The second
part of the paper examines the effect of development assistance in recipient countries. By
comparing development assistance programs that call for the elimination of child labor and
the strengthening of human infrastructure, we find that aid for the elimination of child labor is
effective for middle-income countries, and aid to strengthen human infrastructure is effective
for low-income countries.
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Appendix
Appendix A
We examine the stability of the equilibriums E1 and E2. To examine the local dynamics
of equilibrium E1 (or E2), we take a first-order Taylor expansion of the system around the
E1 = (h
∗, g∗). Noting that hˇt ≡ ht − h∗ and gˇt ≡ gt − g∗, the linearizing of equations (9) and
(11) in the equilibrium E1 is expressed as:(
hˇt+1
gˇt+1
)
=
(
Ω(g∗)1+σ Ω(X(g∗)σ−1 + (1 + σ)ηh∗(g∗)σ)
τηg∗ 1− δ + τηh∗
)(
hˇt
gˇt,
)
where g∗ and h∗ are shown in proposition 1; and Ω ≡ θβ(1−τ)η
(1+β)(1−pi(γ))y¯ and X ≡ σ(1−pi(γ)y¯(1−τ)η . The
characteristic polynomial becomes:
P (κ) = κ2 − Tκ+D,
T = Ω(g∗)1+σ + 1− δ + τηh∗ > 0,
D = Ω(g∗)1+σ(1− δ + τηh∗)− Ωτηg∗(X(g∗)σ−1 + (1 + σ)h∗(g∗)σ).
Azariadis (1993) checks that the steady state is a saddle point, when P (1) < 0 and P (−1) > 0
hold simultaneously.
P (1) = 1− Ω(g∗)1+σ − (1− δ + τηh∗) + Ω(g∗)1+σ(1− δ + τηh∗)− τηΩ(g∗)(X(g∗)σ−1 + (1 + σ)h∗(g∗)σ)
= (1− Ω(g∗)1+σ)(δ − τηh∗)− τηΩ(g∗)(X(g∗)σ−1 + (1 + σ)h∗(g∗)σ).
Now, we suppose that 1 − Ω(g∗)1+σ = 1 − θβ(1−τ)
(1+β)(1−pi(γ))y¯ (g
∗)1+σ < 0. To hold this assump-
tion, (g∗)1+σ should be larger than (1+β)(1−pi(γ))y¯
θβη(1−τ) . Although Lemma 1 shows the steady-state
equilibrium is in the regime (g∗)1+σ < (1−pi(γ))y¯
θβη(1−τ) ≡ gh, because (1−pi(γ))y¯θβη(1−τ) < (1+β)(1−pi(γ))y¯θβη(1−τ) , the
assumption is contradicted.
Next, we examine the sign of δ − τηh∗. Substituting the equilibrium value h∗ = (δg∗ +
γ)/τηg∗ (see equation (16) in the previous equation, δ−τηh∗ = −τηγ < 0, we have P (1) < 0.
p(−1) = 1 + Ω(g∗)1+σ + 1− δ + τηh∗ + Ω(g∗)1+σ(1− δ + τηh∗)− τηΩX((g∗)σ − (1 + σ)τηΩh∗(g∗)1+σ),
= 1 + Ω(g∗)1+σ + 1− δ + Ω(g∗)1+σ(1− δ) + τηh∗ − τηΩX((g∗)σ − στηΩh∗(g∗)1+σ).
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Substituting the equilibrium value of h∗ (see 15), we have
τηh∗ − τηΩX((g∗)σ − στηΩh∗(g∗)1+σ)
=
τηθβ(g∗)σ
(1 + β)(1− pi(γ)y¯ − θβ(1− τ)η(g∗)1+σ (1− σ)(1− pi(γ)y¯(1 + β)
2 > 0.
Therefore, we have P (1) < 0 and P (−1) < 0.
Next, we examine the local dynamics of equilibrium E2 = (h
∗, g∗). Using the same proce-
dure, the linearization of equations (9) and (11) in the equilibrium E2 is expressed as:(
hˇt+1
gˇt+1
)
=
(
0 σθ(g∗)σ−1
τηg∗ 1− δ + τηh∗
)(
hˇt
gˇt
)
.
T = 1− δ + τηh∗ > 0, D = σθ(g∗)σ−1τηg∗ > 0.
Since P (−1) = 1 + T + D > 0 and P (1) = δ − τηh∗ − σθτη(g∗)σ. Because δ − τηhast =
−gamma/g∗ < 0, P (1) < 0. Therefore, E2 is a saddle stable equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Child Labor Trends in Developed Countries
Figure 2: Child Labor Trends in Lagging Countries
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Figure 3: Child Labor Trends in less-developed Countries
Figure 4: Generation Linkage
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Figure 5: Phase Dynamics When η > η¯
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Figure 6: Phase Dynamics When η < η¯
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Description Parameter Value
The utility weight on offspring β 0.5
Productivity in the modern sector η 12
Productivity in the traditional sector y 12
Parameters for human capital accumulation θ 1.2
σ 0.3
Parameters for the revealed probability of child labor γ 0.6
α 0.7
pi 0.2
Depreciation rate of human infrastructure δ 0.6
Labor income tax rate τ 0.05
Initial points (h0, g0) A (0.8, 2.0)
B (0.8, 1.0)
G (2.2, 2.0)
Initial point (h0, g0) D (2.2, 1.8)
Productivity η 15
5
Table 1: The Simulation Parameters
Figure 7: The Transition Dynamics (A)
Figure 8: The Transition Dynamics (B)
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Figure 9: The Transition Dynamics (G)
Figure 10: The Transition Dynamics (D) η=7
Figure 11: The Transition Dynamics (D) η=15
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Figure 12: The Effect of Aid on Child Labor Protection
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Figure 13: The Effect of Aid on Human Infrastructure a < γ
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Figure 14: The Effect of Aid on Human Infrastructure a > γ
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